Climate Change Litigation and Human Rights: Pushing the Boundaries by Savaresi, Annalisa & Auz, Juan
1 
Publisher policy allows this work to be made available in this repository. Published in 
Climate Law, 2019, Volume 9, Issue 3, pp. 244-262 by Brill. The original publication is 
available at: https://doi.org/10.1163/18786561-00903006
Climate Change Litigation and Human Rights: Pushing the Boundaries 
Annalisa Savaresi 
Lecturer in Environmental Law, University of Stirling 
annalisa.savaresi@stir.ac.uk 
Juan Auz 
Alexander von Humboldt Fellow, Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research 
juangauz@gmail.com 
Abstract 
The adoption of the Paris Agreement has prompted a flurry of climate change litigation, 
both to redress the impacts of climate change and to put pressure on state and non-state 
actors to adopt more ambitious action to tackle climate change. The use of human rights 
law as a gap-filler to provide remedies where other areas of the law do not is not new, 
especially in the environmental context. It is therefore not a surprise that human rights 
arguments are increasingly being made, and human rights remedies increasingly being 
sought, in climate change litigation. While relatively few cases have been argued on 
human rights grounds so far, the trend is continuing and accelerating, with some 
striking results. This article takes stock of human rights arguments made in climate 
change litigation to date to gauge what they reveal about the evolving relationship 
between human rights and climate change law—and about possible future 
developments. 
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1. Introduction
In recent years, litigants around the world have increasingly tried to push the boundaries 
of the law by filing test cases to prompt state and corporate actors to take action to 
reduce emissions or to obtain redress for climate-change-related damage to persons, 
property, or the environment. 
The use of human rights law as a gap-filler to provide remedies where other areas of the 
law do not is not new.1 It is thus hardly a surprise that human rights arguments are 
increasingly used in climate change lawsuits. While numerous scholars have attempted 
to make sense of the tidal surge in climate change litigation,2 little specific attention has 
1 See, for example, Alan E. Boyle and Michael R. Anderson (eds.), Human Rights Approaches to 
Environmental Protection (Oxford University Press, 1998); Alan E. Boyle, ‘Human Rights or 
Environmental Rights? A Reassessment’, 18(3) Fordham Environmental Law Review 471 (2007); Dinah 
Shelton (ed.), Human Rights and the Environment (Edward Elgar,, 2011); Alan E. Boyle, ‘Human Rights 
and the Environment: Where Next?’, 23(1) European Journal of International Law 613 (2012); Donald 
K.. Anton and Dinah Shelton, Environmental Protection and Human Rights (Cambridge University 
Press, 2012). 
2 The literature on this issue is vast: see e.g. Christopher James Hilson, ‘Climate Change Litigation: An 
Explanatory Approach (or Bringing Grievance Back In)’, in Climate Change: la Risposta del Diritto, 
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been paid thus far to the use of human rights arguments.3 This article focuses 
specifically on the use of human rights law arguments in this litigation. At the time of 
writing, the main global repositories of climate change litigation, curated by the Sabin 
Centre for Climate Change Law, at Columbia Law School, and the Grantham Research 
Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, at the London School of Economics,4 
together list a total of 29 climate cases that make some reference to human rights. This 
‘human rights based’ climate change litigation comprises both cases argued solely on 
human rights grounds and cases argued on the basis of human rights together with other 
grounds. While these databases are not complete, we use them as a source to reflect on 
the practice of climate change litigation associated with human rights arguments. 
 
More specifically, this article looks at climate change litigation to understand when and 
how human rights arguments can successfully be used in relation to climate change. The 
aim is to gauge what this case law reveals about the evolving relationship between 
human rights and climate change law, the limitations inherent in this linkage, and 
opportunities for further development. First we contextualise human rights arguments in 
climate change litigation, distinguishing between the litigation strategies and actors 
involved. We then review recent case law, highlighting the most significant 
developments in relation to the rights of future generations and extraterritoriality. We 
conclude with some reflections on what this analysis reveals about the evolving 
relationship between human rights and climate change law. 
 
2. Climate Change Litigation and Human Rights 
 
The copious literature on climate change litigation commonly distinguishes between so-
called ‘proactive’ litigation—initiated in order to engender policy change, for example 
by civil-society actors asking for the adoption or reform of climate legislation; and 
‘reactive’ litigation—initiated to oppose such change, for example by corporate actors 
 
edited by Fabrizio Fracchia and Massimo Occhiena (Naples: Editoriale Scientifica, 2010); Navraj-Singh 
Ghaleigh, ‘“Six Honest Serving-Men”: Climate Change Litigation as Legal Mobilization and the Utility 
of Typologies’, 1(1) Climate Law 31 (2010); Lisa Vanhala and Chris Hilson, ‘Climate Change Litigation: 
Symposium Introduction’, 35(3) Law & Policy 141 (2013); Jacqueline Peel and Hari M. Osofsky, Climate 
Change Litigation: Regulatory Pathways to Cleaner Energy (Cambridge University Press, 2015); Jolene 
Lin, ‘Climate Change and the Courts’, 32(1) Legal Studies 35 (2012); Kim Bouwer, ‘The Unsexy Future 
of Climate Change Litigation’, 30(3) Journal of Environmental Law 483 (2018); Geetanjali Ganguly, 
Joana Setzer and Veerle Heyvaert, ‘If at First You Don’t Succeed: Suing Corporations for Climate 
Change’, 38(4) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 841 (2018). 
3 With the sole exception of Jacqueline Peel and Hari M. Osofsky, ‘A Rights Turn in Climate Change 
Litigation?’, 7 (1) Transnational Environmental Law 37 (2018); Joana Setzer and Lisa C. Vanhala, 
‘Climate Change Litigation: A Review of Research on Courts and Litigants in Climate Governance’, 10 
(3) Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change e580 (2019); Margaretha Wewerinke Singh, ‘State 
Responsibility for Human Rights Violations Associated with Climate Change’, in Handbook on Human 
Rights and Climate Governance, edited by Sébastien Duyck, Sébastien Jodoin and Alyssa Johl 
(Routledge, 2018). 
4 See the databases curated by the Sabin Centre at Columbia Law School: <http://climatecasechart.com/> 
and the Grantham Research Institute at the London School of Economics: 
<http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/climate-change-laws-of-the-world/> accessed 28 February 




resisting the adoption of new or reformed legislation.5 While the latter strand of 
litigation has long been common,6 a surge in proactive climate change litigation 
followed the adoption of the Paris Agreement.7  
 
Proactive climate change litigation may itself be divided into legal suits between non-
state and state actors (e.g. citizens suing governments); between non-state actors (e.g. 
citizens suing corporations); and between state actors (one state suing another).8 While 
the first category encompasses the lion’s share of litigation, the second one has grown 
rapidly in recent years, and the last one for the time being is of scholarly interest only.9 
 
This division also holds for human rights based climate change litigation. In May 2019 
there were 29 human rights cases listed in the databases of the Sabin Centre and the 
Grantham Institute. Of these cases, fifteen are pending at the time of writing and just a 
quarter have been successful, while the rest have been denied. In all except two, citizens 
or civil-society organizations challenged state action (or inaction).  
 
This concentration of cases is to be expected, given that under human rights law the 
main duty-holder is the state. And, as discussed elsewhere in this special issue,10 in 
recent years, human rights bodies have done much work to clarify the content of states’ 
human rights obligations in relation to climate change.11 This interpretative work has 
clearly shown that obligations associated with both substantive human rights (e.g. the 
right to life, adequate housing, food, and the highest attainable standard of health) and 
procedural human rights (such as the right to access to remedies12 and to take part in the 
conduct of public affairs) take on a specific character in relation to climate change.13 
 
In particular, these obligations require that states take preventative measures to avert the 
impacts of climate change on the enjoyment of human rights, and, if such impacts have 
occurred, take remedial measures to address them.14 Furthermore, human rights 
 
5 See e.g. Hilson, supra note 2, at 421; Ghaleigh, supra note 2, at 45; Peel and Osofsky, supra note 2, at 
30–31. 
6 See e.g. David Markell and J.B. Ruhl, ‘An Empirical Assessment of Climate Change in the Courts: A 
New Jurisprudence or Business as Usual?’ 64(1) Florida Law Review 15 (2012); Peel and Osofsky, supra 
note 2. 
7 See Setzer and Vanlhala, supra note n. 3 above.  
8 Michael G. Faure and Andre Nollkaemper, ‘International Liability as an Instrument to Prevent and 
Compensate for Climate Change’ 43(A) Stanford Journal of International Law 123 (2007), at 128. 
9 At the time of writing, the Grantham Institute database lists 224 cases with governments as respondents; 
35 cases with corporate respondents; and 11 cases with individuals as respondents.  
10 Cross reference to Knox’s article. 
11 OHCHR, Mapping Human Rights Obligations Relating to the Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and 
Sustainable Environment: Focus Report on Human Rights and Climate Change (2014); and OHCHR, 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Issue of Human Rights Obligations Relating to the Enjoyment of 
a Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment, A/HRC/31/52 (2016), at paras. 50–64. See also the 
analysis in Annalisa Savaresi, ‘Human Rights and Climate Change’, in International Environmental Law-
making and Diplomacy Review 2018 - Human Rights and the Environment, edited by Tuula Honkonen 
and Seita Romppanen, (Finland: University of Eastern Finland and UNEP, 2019), available at: 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3327981> accessed 3 March 2019. 
12 OHCHR, supra note 11 (2016), at para. 63 
13 Ibid. 




obligations require states to properly assess not only the impacts of climate change itself 
but also of measures proposed or taken to tackle climate change, and to make such 
information public.15 States are expected to enable public participation in decision-
making about climate change action, especially by those likely to be affected.16 Finally, 
states must provide access to remedies for climate-related human rights violations, 
which might include monetary compensation and injunctive relief.17 
 
Most crucially, States’ human rights obligations entail that they protect individuals and 
groups against abuse by third parties, including business enterprises, by preventing, 
investigating, punishing and redressing such abuses through effective policies, 
legislation, regulations and adjudication.18 Even though conventionally emissions are 
attributed to states, in fact it is non-state actors that are largely responsible for causing 
emissions. Recent studies suggest that a group of multinational corporations–so called 
Carbon majors and including like Exxon, Shell and CEMEX–are historically 
responsible for the lion’s share of global greenhouse gas emissions.19 These studies 
have prompted a surge in climate litigation against corporate actors, within and outside 
the US.20 The responsibility of corporations for human rights breaches associated with 
climate change has also increasingly come under the spotlight, as a result.  
 
These developments are in and of themselves remarkable, if one considers that only ten 
years ago, a report of the Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights (OHCHR) 
warned that ‘while climate change has obvious implications for the enjoyment of human 
rights, it is less obvious whether, and to what extent, such effects can be qualified as 
human rights violations in a strict legal sense’.21 The report went on to caution that it 
would be ‘virtually impossible to disentangle the complex causal relationships’ linking 
emissions to human rights violations, and that in all events the adverse effects of climate 
change are often projections about future impacts, whereas human rights violations are 
normally established after the harm has occurred.22  
 
 
15 Ibid., at paras. 54-55. 
16 Ibid., at para. 59. 
17 Ibid., at para. 63 
18 Ibid., at para. 66; OHCHR, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary- General on the Issue 
of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, A/HRC/17/31 (2011), 
Annex, Principle 1. 
19 See Richard Heede, ‘Tracing Anthropogenic Carbon Dioxide and Methane Emissions to Fossil Fuel 
and Cement Producers, 1854–2010’, 122 (1-2) Climatic Change 229 (2014); Peter C. Frumhoff, Richard 
Heede and Naomi Oreskes, ‘The Climate Responsibilities of Industrial Carbon Producers’, 132 (2) 
Climatic Change 157 (2015); and Brenda Ekwurzel et al., ‘The Rise in Global Atmospheric CO2, Surface 
Temperature, and Sea Level from Emissions Traced to Major Carbon Producers’ 144 (4) Climatic 
Change 579 (2017). 
20 In May 2019, the database of Sabin Centre database listed 22 such cases outside the US, but does not 
systematically report information concerning law suits within the US, which are instead widely reported 
in the press. See for example: https://www.climateliabilitynews.org/category/exxon-climate-
investigation/.  
21 OHCHR, Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the 





These caveats were echoed in the literature, with the future UN Special Rapporteur on 
Human Rights and the Environment warning that, if there was scope to recognize the 
negative obligation to refrain from causing harm in the context of international human 
rights law, such an application would ‘treat climate change as a series of individual 
transboundary harms, rather than as a global threat to human rights.’23  
 
So what has changed in just ten years’ time? Human rights arguments are increasingly 
used to prop up those based on private or public law, while only a handful of cases are 
argued solely on the basis of human rights arguments. While in fact human rights 
remedies alone are ill-suited to address environmental harm, they potentially provide an 
avenue to address personal injury and property damage, which can be framed in terms 
of human rights violations. The success of human rights arguments depends upon 
whether a victim can substantiate a claim that a duty-bearer has failed to comply with 
human rights obligations—whether positive or negative.24 
 
In particular, human rights arguments associated with climate change can be formulated 
in two main ways: applicants may complain that there has been a failure to act (e.g. a 
failure to adopt or implement ambitious climate policies) resulting in human rights 
violations; or that certain activities (e.g. permits or licenses to extract fossil fuels or log 
forests) have led to human rights violations. The sections below look at how these 
arguments have been used in climate change litigation, first against states, and then 
against non-state actors. 
 
3. The Use of Human Rights Arguments Against States 
 
Human rights arguments in climate change litigation are increasingly used to support 
complaints over states’ failure to mitigate climate change, and, to a more limited extent, 
to address the impacts of climate change. As explained above, courts and human rights 
bodies have increasingly been asked to consider the human rights implications of states’ 
action (e.g. licenses for oil extraction25) or inaction (insufficient ambition in targets 
enshrined in law and policy being one example26) on climate change. Two landmark 
decisions taken in 2018 have shown that, when properly framed, human rights 
arguments may be successful. 
 
23 John H. Knox, ‘Climate Change and Human Rights Law’ 50 (1) Virginia Journal of International Law 
163 (2009), 211. 
24 See Annalisa Savaresi, Jacques Hartmann, and Ioana Cismas, ‘The Impacts of Climate Change and 
Human Rights: Some Early Reflections on the Carbon Majors Inquiry’ (SSRN Scholarly Paper, 2018), 
available at <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3277568> accessed 5 November 2018. 
25 Greenpeace Nordic Association and Nature and Youth v. Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, Case no. 
16-166674TVI-OTIR/06 (Oslo District Court) (4 January 2018) English translation available at: 
<https://elaw.org/system/files/attachments/publicresource/OsloDistrictCt_20180104.pdf?_ga=2.19022781
6.2102297674.1551362906-954583716.1551362906> accessed 2 February 2019. 
26 Urgenda Foundation and 886 Citizens v. The State of the Netherlands, 9 October 2018, 
ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2018:2610. English translation available at 
<https://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2018:2610> accessed 2 
November 2018 (hereinafter Urgenda case). See also the case lodged by a group of Torres Strait Islanders 
before the UN Human Rights Committee, challenging the Australian government for inadequate climate 
action, < https://www.clientearth.org/press/climate-threatened-torres-strait-islanders-bring-human-rights-





In the first, a group of Colombian youth successfully challenged the Colombian 
government for failure to tackle deforestation in the Amazon, thereby breaching several 
human rights obligations enshrined both in the Colombian Constitution and in 
international instruments.27 In the second, the Urgenda Foundation and a sizeable group 
of citizens successfully challenged the Dutch government for not taking sufficiently 
ambitious action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.28 While the Dutch case had in the 
first instance been decided on the basis of administrative and tort law,29 the Court of 
Appeal of The Hague set aside a restrictive interpretation of victimhood requirements 
and framed the state’s duty of care with reference also to rights enshrined in the 
European Convention on Human Rights30—such as the right to life and the right to 
respect for private and family life.31 
 
These victories have encouraged litigants and human rights advocates to push the 
boundaries even further. For example, in 2018, the UN Special Rapporteur on Human 
Rights and the Environment, David Boyd, unprecedentedly intervened in a case before 
an Irish court,32 drawing attention to the state’s ‘clear, positive and enforceable 
obligations’ to protect its citizens against the infringement of human rights caused by 
climate change.33  
 
Applicants are also becoming more ambitious in their demands. The so-called People’s 
Climate Case challenges lack of ambition in European Union (EU) climate legislation, 
on the basis of human rights enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
EU.34  
 
These developments clearly show not only that human rights arguments are being 
increasingly deployed, but also that demands associated with the protection of human 
 
27 25 Children and Youth v. Colombian Government [2018] Supreme Court of Justice of Colombia 
STC4360-2018, 11001-22-03-000-2018-00319–01 (hereinafter Future Generations v. Colombia). 
Interpretation and translation of this document, originally written in Spanish, has been carried out by the 
authors. 
28 Urgenda, supra note 26.  
29 See e.g. the commentaries by Marjan Peeters, ‘Urgenda Foundation and 886 Individuals v. The State of 
the Netherlands: The Dilemma of More Ambitious Greenhouse Gas Reduction Action by EU Member 
States’, 25(1) Review of European, Comparative & International Environmental Law 215 (2016); and 
Josephine van Zeben, ‘Establishing a Governmental Duty of Care for Climate Change Mitigation: Will 
Urgenda Turn the Tide?’, 4(2) Transnational Environmental Law 339 (2015).  
30 Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 
UNTS 222 (1950), arts., articles 2 and 8;. Urgenda, supra note 26, at 43. 
31 Jonathan Verschuuren, ‘The State of the Netherlands v Urgenda Foundation: The Hague Court of 
Appeal Upholds Judgment Requiring the Netherlands to Further Reduce Its Greenhouse Gas Emissions’, 
0(0) Review of European, Comparative & International Environmental Law (2019), available at: 
<https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/reel.12280> accessed 28 February 2019. 
32 Climate Case Ireland, available at: <https://www.climatecaseireland.ie>. 
33 Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environment, Statement on the Human Rights 
Obligations related to Climate Change with a Particular Focus on the Right to Life, 2018, available at: 
<https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Environment/FriendsIrishEnvironment25Oct2018.pdf> 
accessed 29 January 2018. 
34 European Union, ‘Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union’, 55 Official Journal of the 




rights are becoming bolder. Far from targeting only actual harm to persons and/or 
property, in fact, human rights arguments are deployed to sanction harm that is 
predicted to happen in future – and thus affect future generations –or harm occurring 
outside of the bounds of a state’s territory. The next sections look more closely at how 
these arguments are potentially revolutionary and how they fit into the bigger picture of 
climate change litigation.  
 
3.1. The Rights of Present and Future Generations 
 
In April 2018, Colombia’s Supreme Court of Justice handed down a pioneering ruling 
that recognizes the link between deforestation, climate change, and the violation of the 
human rights of present and future generations.35 The applicants—twenty-five children 
and young people from different regions of Colombia—argued that deforestation in the 
Amazon region causes climate change, threatening the enjoyment of the rights to a 
healthy environment, life, health, food, and access to water—rights enshrined in the 
Colombian Constitution and in international human rights instruments ratified by 
Colombia.36 Accordingly, they filed an accion de tutela against the Colombian 
government. Similar to the amparo—a constitutional-law institution present in most 
Latin American countries37—the tutela is a procedure established by the Colombian 
Constitution to enable alleged victims of human rights violations to request Colombian 
courts to scrutinize the actions or omissions of public authorities and, exceptionally, of 
individuals.38 
 
The applicants’ request was at first deemed to be inadmissible on the grounds that other 
legal action, namely accion popular, was more appropriate.39 Eventually, this decision 
was overturned on appeal by the Supreme Court of Justice, which went on to decide the 
merits of the case. The court accepted the applicants’ complaints, finding that projected 
temperature rises associated with greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation in the 
Amazon violated the human rights of future generations.40 The court reasoned that the 
rights of future generations hinge on two elements: ‘solidarity of our species as an 
ethical duty’—a concept that builds upon that of sustainable development and imposes 
 
35 Future Generations v. Colombia, supra note 27, at 37. 
36 José Daniel Rodríguez Peña et al., Accion de Tutela, Higher Court of Bogota’s Judicial District, 29 
January 2018, at 143.  
37 Allan R. Brewer-Carias, ‘The Amparo as an Instrument of a Ius Constitutionale Commune’, in 
Transformative Constitutionalism in Latin America: The Emergence of a new Ius Commune, edited by 
Armin von Bogdandy et. al. (Oxford University Press, 2017). 
38 Liliana Carrera Silva, ‘La Acción de Tutela en Colombia’, 5(27) Revista del Instituto de Ciencias 
Jurídicas de Puebla 72 (2011); Katrin Merhof, ‘Building a Bridge between Reality and the Constitution: 
The Establishment and Development of the Colombian Constitutional Court’, 13(3) International Journal 
of Constitutional Law 714 (2015), at 719. 
39 25 Children and Youth v. Colombian Government [2018] Decision of First Instance by the Higher 
Court of Bogota’s Judicial District, 11001220300020180031900, available at 
<http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/non-us-case-
documents/2018/20180212_11001-22-03-000-2018-00319-00_decision-1.pdf> accessed on 20 May 
2019, at p. 20 DeJusticia, ‘Línea de Tiempo Tutela Generaciones Futuras y Cambio Climático’, 
DeJusticia, 27 April 2018, available at: <https://www.dejusticia.org/tutela-cambio-climatico-colombia/> 
accessed 2 March 2019.  




limits to the freedom of present generations; and ‘the intrinsic value of nature’, which 
transcends an ‘anthropocentric perspective’ and requires avoidance of an ‘irresponsible’ 
use of the environment.41 The court rooted these concepts in a ‘global ecological public 
order’, built on the foundations of international instruments, including the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the Stockholm and Rio 
Declarations; and the Paris Agreement.42 
 
The court ordered the Colombian government to take action to tackle deforestation in 
the Amazon, and unprecedently asked it to involve the applicants in the related 
decision-making process.43 In particular, the court ordered several governmental 
entities, including the Presidency of Colombia and the Ministry of Environment and 
Sustainable Development, to liaise with the applicants, the affected communities, and 
interested members of the public, to formulate a comprehensive policy plan to counter 
deforestation in the Amazon as a way to mitigate and adapt to the effects of climate 
change.44 
 
This judgment consolidates the Colombian courts’ reputation for being particularly 
innovative when it comes to ruling in favour of those affected by environmental harm,45 
establishing precedents that are likely to inspire other courts in the region.46 This case 
therefore eloquently illustrates the potential to use human rights arguments in strategic 
litigation, to put pressure on states to protect the interests of future generations. 
However, the enforcement of this and similar judgements is not to be taken for 
granted—a problem that resonates well beyond Latin America, and indeed affects 
human rights and environmental law in general.47 
 
3.2. Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Obligations 
 
Like the rights of future generations, states’ responsibility to protect the human rights of 
those beyond their territorial boundaries has long been regarded as problematic. While 
arguably under some instruments these obligations have extraterritorial application,48 
 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid., at 22–34. 
43 Ibid., at 22. 
44 Ibid., at 48–50. 
45 Everaldo Lamprea, ‘Collective Environmental Litigation in Colombia: An Empirical Assessment’ in 
Courts and the Environment, edited by Christina Voigt and Zen Makuch (Edward Elgar Publishing, 
2018). 
46 José Parra, ‘The Role of Domestic Courts in International Human Rights Law: The Constitutional 
Court of Colombia and Free, Prior and Informed Consent’, 23(3) International Journal on Minority and 
Group Rights 355 (2016) at 381. 
47 International Council on Human Rights Policy, Assessing the Effectiveness of National Human Rights 
Institutions (Switzerland: OHCHR, 2005); Felice D. Gaer, ‘The Effectiveness of the United Nations 
Human Rights Protection Machinery: The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights’, 108 Proceedings 
of the ASIL Annual Meeting 281; Par Engstrom, ‘Human Rights: Effectiveness of International and 
Regional Mechanisms’, Oxford Research Encyclopaedia of International Studies (2017); and Neil 
Gunningham, ‘Enforcing Environmental Regulation’, 23(2) Journal of Environmental Law169 (2011)., 
Pages 169–201. 
48 See e.g. Marko Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties: Law, Principles, and 




many states and companies resist this understanding, maintaining that states are the sole 
bearers of human rights obligations, which only protect those within a state’s territory, 
or in another territory under its effective control.49  
 
These questions were at the core of Inuit petition filed before the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) in 2005.50 As recounted already in this special 
issue,51 the applicants argued that the United States—then the world’s largest 
greenhouse gas emitter—was responsible for human rights violations associated with 
the impacts of climate change in the Canadian and US Arctic.52 The IACHR, however, 
dismissed the petition on procedural grounds.53 The question of states’ responsibility to 
protect the human rights of those beyond their territory has since been considered in 
2017, in a landmark advisory opinion by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(IACtHR).54 
 
In reply to a question over state obligations on the environment, in the context of the 
rights recognized by the American Convention on Human Rights,55 in the Organization 
of American States system and by regional environmental instruments,56the court 
explained that states have the obligation to prevent significant damage to the 
environment inside or outside their territory, whether produced by themselves or third 
parties.57 The court considered that any harm that can directly or indirectly have an 
effect on the enjoyment of substantive human rights is to be considered significant in 
this connection.58 From this obligation to prevent significant harm, a series of specific 
obligations arise, which include an obligation to regulate, supervise, and monitor 
activities carried out by a state or private entities under a state’s jurisdiction that can 
lead to environmental damage.59 
 
The IACtHR advisory opinion opens a window of opportunity for future climate 
litigation based on human rights arguments, and may well inspire other human rights 
 
Human Rights Treaty Obligations Apply Extraterritorially?’, Faculty Scholarship Series 4722 (2011). 
Available at: <http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/4722> accessed 2 November 2018. 
49 See e.g. Supplemental Amicus Briefs in Support of Neither Party (Kiobel II) in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Shell Petroleum Co, et al, 621 F.3d 11 (2d Cir Sept 17, 2010) 12.  
50 Petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Seeking Relief from Violations Resulting 
from Global Warming Caused by Acts and Omissions of the United States, 7 December 2005, available 
at: <www.ciel.org/Publications/ICC_Petition_7Dec05.pdf> accessed 3 March 2019. 
51 Cross reference to Knox piece. 
52 Ibid. at 5. 
53 IACHR, Letter from Ariel E Dulitzky, Assistant Executive Secretary, OAS, to Paul Crowley, Legal 
Representative for Sheila Watt-Cloutier and Others, regarding Petition P-1413–05, 16 November 2006. 
54 See Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, 15 November 2017 
55 OAS, American Convention on Human Rights, 9(4) International Law Materials 673 (1970). (adopted 
22 November 1969, entered into force 18 July 1978). 
56 Namely, the Convention for the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment of the Wider 
Caribbean Region, 1506 UNTS 25974 (adopted 24 March 1983, entered into force 11 October 1986). 
57 Supra note 54, at paras. 119, 133, 174. For a commentary, see Ricardo Abello and Walter Arevalo, 
‘Inter-American Court of Human Rights Advisory Opinion OC-23/17: Jurisdictional, Procedural and 
Substantive Implications of Human Rights Duties in the Context of Environmental Protection’, Review of 
European, Comparative and International Environmental Law (Forthcoming, 2019). 
58 Ibid, at para. 140. 




bodies to recognize breaches of state obligations in the context of climate change. For 
instance, the IACHR may rely on the court’s reasoning in its ongoing investigation of 
Athabaskan v. Canada.60 The Athabaskan people allege that Canada has breached 
human rights obligations by failing to regulate emissions of black carbon, which affect 
Athabaskan communities, and also of those situated outside Canada’s territory. This 
would be the first time that an international human rights body acknowledges the 
extraterritorial reach of states’ human rights obligations in relation to the impacts of 
climate change, adding a missing piece to the puzzle of the human rights and climate 
change nexus.61   
 
While it remains to be seen whether the Commission’s assessment of the Athabaskan 
petition will significantly differ from that of Inuit, the IACtHR advisory opinion 
certainly provides fresh new ground to establish that harm arising from black carbon 
emissions constitutes a violation of human rights with an extraterritorial dimension. 
 
3.3. ‘Systemic’ Litigation 
 
Litigation strategies construed on human rights arguments are becoming ever more 
audacious and systemic in scope. The most ambitious to date is probably the so-called 
People’s Climate, lodged before the Court of Justice of the EU in 2018, by 37 applicants 
from Kenya, Fiji, Portugal, Germany, France, Italy, Romania, and the Swedish Sami 
youth association Sáminuorra.62 The applicants seeks to set aside and replace a whole 
set of EU climate law instruments at the heart of the EU’s 2030 Climate and Energy 
Framework, to be implemented between 2021 and 2030. These are: the Emissions 
Trading Directive, which covers greenhouse gas emissions from large industrial 
installations in the EU; the Effort Sharing Regulation, which sets reduction targets for 
the other sectors, such as energy efficiency in buildings and transport; and the LULUCF 
Regulation, on emissions from land use, land-use change, and forestry.63 The applicants 
argue that these instruments lack ambition, and asked the Court to set them aside and to 
 
60 Arctic Athabaskan Council, Petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Seeking 
Relief from Violations of the Rights of Arctic Athabaskan Peoples Resulting from Rapid Arctic Warming 
and Melting Caused by Emissions of Black Carbon by Canada, 13 April 2013, at 52, available at: 
<http://earthjustice.org/sites/default/files/AAC_PETITION_13-04-23a.pdf>. 
61 For more information on the role of human rights treaty bodies in the context of climate change, see 
CIEL and The Global Initiative for ESC Rights, States’ Human Rights Obligations in the Context of 
Climate Change: 2019 Update (2019), available at <https://www.ciel.org/reports/states-human-rights-
obligations-context-climate-change-2019-update/> accessed 20 May 2019. 
62 European Union General Court, ‘Action brought on 23 May 2018 — Carvalho and Others v. Parliament 
and Council T-330/18’ 61 Official Journal of the European Union 2018/C 285/51 (2018) (hereinafter 
Carvalho and Others v. Parliament and Council). 
63 European Parliament and Council, ‘Directive 2018/410 of 14 March 2018 amending Directive 
2003/87/EC to enhance cost-effective emission reductions and low-carbon investments, and Decision 
(EU) 2015/1814’, 61 Official Journal of the European Union L 76/3 (2018); European Parliament and 
Council, ‘Regulation 2018/842 of 30 May 2018 on binding annual greenhouse gas emission reductions by 
Member States from 2021 to 2030 contributing to climate action to meet commitments under the Paris 
Agreement and amending Regulation (EU) No 525/2013’ 61 Official Journal of the European Union L 
156/26 (2018); European Parliament and Council, ‘Regulation  2018/841 of 30 May 2018 on the 
inclusion of greenhouse gas emissions and removals from land use, land use change and forestry in the 
2030 climate and energy framework, and amending Regulation (EU) No 525/2013 and Decision No 




order the EU to adopt and implement more stringent measures for the reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions.64 
 
In particular, the applicants used human rights arguments to contend that the EU is 
obliged to prevent climate change related violations of the rights protected by the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, including the rights to health, life, work, 
property, and equal treatment, as well as the rights of children to such protection and 
care as is necessary for their well-being and education.65 Human rights obligations are 
thus here used to argue that the EU ‘is responsible for taking measures to regulate 
emissions of greenhouse gases from within the Union to avoid [this] harm and to 
prevent infringements of fundamental rights’, and to ‘adopt positive steps to reduce 
emissions even if these are attributed to private actors’.66 In construing their arguments, 
the applicants invoked the case law of the European Court of Human Rights concerning 
the duty of a state to protect its citizens from environmental harm;67 and they relied on 
the customary international law obligation to prevent significant harm in areas beyond 
national jurisdiction—thereby justifying the inclusion of applicants from Kenya and 
Fiji.68 The precautionary approach was furthermore used as a basis to ask for measures 
averting widespread human rights violations associated with delays in climate change 
mitigation.69 Finally, the applicants put forward criteria to determine what may be 
considered adequate action on the basis of principles enshrined in international climate 
treaties, including equity, the right to development, and common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities.70 
 
At the time of writing, the CJEU is in the process of deciding on the admissibility of the 
case. The defendants filed pleas of inadmissibility, contending that the CJEU is an 
inappropriate forum to address widespread responsibility, uncertain causation, and 
damages that are not individually felt but rather indistinguishable. 71 They concluded 
that the applicants’ redress would be better attained through legal action before national 
courts.72 However, the applicants have retorted that the 2030 Climate and Energy 
Framework sets EU member states on track to emit ‘unlawfully excessive’ greenhouse 
gases, constituting an interference with the enjoyment of the applicants’ human rights.73  
 
64 Action brought on 23 May 2018 — Carvalho and Others v. Parliament and Council, supra nota 61, at 
35. 
65 European Parliament, Council and Commission, ‘Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union’, 55 Official Journal of the European Union C 326/2 (2012). See art. 35 (health care), art. 2 (right 
to life), art. 15 (right to engage in work), art. 17 (right to property), art. 20 (equality before the law), art. 
24 (right of the child).  
66Carvalho and Others v. Parliament and Council, available at 
<https://peoplesclimatecase.caneurope.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/application-delivered--european-
general-court.pdf>, at para 165. 
67 Ibid., at para. 173. 
68 Ibid., at para. 207. 
69 Ibid., at para. 217. 
70 Ibid., at paras. 190 and pp. 37-54. 
71 Carvalho and Others v. Parliament and Council, Applicant’s Reply to the Defendants’ Pleas of 
Inadmissibility (2018), available at < https://peoplesclimatecase.caneurope.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/12/submission-10122018-plea-of-inadmiss.pdf>. 
72 Ibid., at 24. 





Far from ‘treating climate change as a series of individual transboundary harms’, 
therefore, the applicants here are trying to argue that climate change should be averted 
because it systematically threatens the enjoyment of human rights, within and without 
the territory of the EU. Regardless of its outcome, the People’s Climate Case is 
significant, in that it challenges a package of climate legislation even before it is 
implemented, arguing that its implementation would lead to systemic breaches, not only 
of the rights of  EU citizens, but also of those residing outside the EU.  
 
4. The Use of Juman Rights Arguments against Corporate Actors  
 
State and non-state actors around the world are increasingly suing corporations for harm 
associated with climate change.74 While these law suits have largely been argued on the 
basis of tort law, applicants have recently started to argue that corporations hold specific 
human rights responsibilities in this connection. 
 
However, this is an area where human rights law is not clear-cut. The so-called business 
and human rights regime hinges on the state duty to protect, the corporate responsibility 
to respect, and access to remedies, which form the three pillars of the UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights.75 While these principles are commonly 
regarded as soft law, recent developments provide some evidence that the corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights has gained traction in both national and 
international law.76  
 
As testified by the ongoing negotiations on an international legally binding instrument 
on transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human 
rights,77 and by developments in national law,78 and decisions by national79 and 
international courts, in recent years much attention has been dedicated to clarifying 
corporate responsibility vis-à-vis the protection of human rights. For example, in 




74 See the reportage: Climate Liability News, ‘Exxon Climate Investigation’, Climate Liability News, 
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‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework, A/HRC/17/31 (2011). 
76 See discussion in Ioana Cismas and Sarah Macrory, ‘The Business and Human Rights Regime under 
International Law: Remedy without Law?’ in Non-State Actors and International Obligations: Creation, 
Evolution and Enforcement, edited by James Summers and Alex Gough (Brill, 2018) at 224-260. 
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an International Legally Binding Instrument on Transnational and other Business Enterprises with 
respect to Human Rights, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/26/9. See: 
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78 See the review of legislation in Claire Methven O'Brien, and Sumithra Dhanarajan, ‘The Corporate 
Responsibility to Respect Human Rights: A Status Review’, 29(4) Accounting, Auditing and 
Accountability Journal 542 (2015), pp. 542-567. 
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At this juncture, it is therefore to be admitted that the human right for everyone’s dignity 
and its right for adequate housing and living conditions are complemented by an 
obligation on all parts, public and private parties, not to engage in activity aimed at 
destroying such rights.80  
 
It is therefore no surprise that complaints against corporations on the basis of human 
rights arguments have started to make their appearance also in climate change litigation 
databases.81 
 
The so-called Carbon Majors inquiry is especially representative of the type of 
arguments made in these complaints.82 The inquiry – which is in its conclusive stages at 
the time of writing – was initiated by Human Rights Commission of the Philippines to 
establish the responsibility of the world’s largest corporate emitters for human rights 
violations, or threats thereof, resulting from the impacts of climate change.83 The 
inquiry was initiated at the request of a group of Filipino citizens and NGOs, following 
the widespread loss of life and harm to property and persons associated with the 
increasingly extreme weather events affecting the Philippines.84 The petitioners based 
their arguments on the human rights obligations enshrined in both national and 
international law, suggesting that these instruments impose specific obligations on the 
Carbon Majors.85  
 
The inquiry is unique for three main reasons. First, the inquiry deals with the impacts of 
climate change in an extraterritorial context but– unlike the IACHR petitions described 
above – it does not target states, but corporations headquartered outside of the 
Philippines. Second, the inquiry is being conducted by a national human rights 
commission, which is a quasi-judicial body normally tasked to look into domestic 
breaches of human rights issues, rather than into transnational ones. Therefore, the 
remedies that the Commission can offer are constrained by the domestic authorities’ 
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Climate Change’ (Asia Pacific Forum of National Human Rights Institutions & the Global Alliance of 
National Human Rights Institutions 2017) 6, 
<www.asiapacificforum.net/media/resource_file/APF_Paper_Amicus_Brief_HR_Climate_Change.pdf> 




limited capability to affect the behaviour of the Carbon Majors.86 Third – and unlike the 
Dutch and the Colombian cases analysed above – several of the petitioners have 
allegedly already experienced actual harm associated with the impacts of climate 
change.  
 
Should the Philippine Human Rights Commission find that the Carbon Majors’ are 
responsible for human rights violations resulting fromthe impacts of climate change, this 
would be a primer and could have repercussions on the use of human rights arguments in 
ongoing climate change litigation against the Carbon Majors elsewhere. For example, 
Friends of the Earth (Netherlands), six NGOs and around 400 citizens have recently 
announced their plans to sue Shell for breaches of the duty of care associated with its 
contribution to climate change and its continued investments in fossil fuels. Similar to 
Urgenda, the applicants are planning to rely, amongst others, on the right to life and the 
right to respect for private and family life, home and correspondence recognised by the 
European Convention of Human Rights.87  
 
The outcome of the Carbon Majors inquiry may therefore resonate well beyond the 
Philippines. For the time being, the inquiry has already set a significant precedent, by 
showing that a national human rights commission may look into the responsibility of 
corporate actors headquartered outside of the state where it operates. The inquiry’s 
findings may furthermore establish that corporations may be held responsible for human 
rights violations associated with the impacts of climate change, marking another 




Given the pace of new developments, a review of the use of human rights arguments in 
climate change litigation could not but provide a snapshot of a rapidly changing picture. 
This analysis shows that these human rights arguments have clearly built on and gone 
beyond those made in earlier case law concerning human rights and the environment. 
Climate change law developments following the adoption of the Paris Agreement are 
clearly blowing wind in the sails of the burgeoning debate on the links between human 
rights and environmental law.88 It is therefore no coincidence that the UN Special 
Rapporteur is now preparing a new thematic report focusing on human rights 
obligations related to climate change, including for the first time a right to a stable 
climate.89 
 
So far, some significant milestones have been achieved. Applicants in Urgenda and 
Future Generations v. Colombia have convinced courts to grant declaratory relief, 
expose inaction, and order states to do more to tackle climate change. These decisions 
have relied on a novel approach to the interpretation of human rights vis-à-vis climate 
 
86 See Savaresi, Hartmann and Cismas, supra note 24. 
87 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 30, arts. 2 and 
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88 As noted also in Savaresi, supra note 11.  





change law obligations. However, human rights remedies offer little, if any, 
compensatory relief for the impacts of climate change, few means to deter further harm, 
and clearly are no replacement for tort-like liability for climate change impacts. Yet, 
successful human rights arguments can help to bring about a change in attitude by 
courts and lawmakers.90 In this connection, human rights law can contribute to 
engendering a momentum to deal with one of the most intractable challenges yet to face 
humankind, by better considering the rights of future generations, and by better 
protecting those living outwith a state’s territory against harm caused by climate 
change.91 
 
Looking ahead, we expect that these successes will inspire others to use human rights 
arguments to put pressure on state and corporate actors, both to increase ambition in 
combating climate change and to redress harm caused by its impacts. The outcome of 
pending complaints, such as the Carbon Majors inquiry and the People’s Climate case, 
may further embolden applicants or suggest new avenues to test the full potential of 
human rights arguments. 
 
This article has sought to demonstrate that the boundaries of the law have already been 
shifted. Human rights arguments have been used not only to complain about actual 
harm, but also about future harms, and not only caused by states, but also by corporate 
actors, even in an extraterritorial context. We have therefore already gone a long way, 
compared with where we were only ten years ago, when the OHCHR report made its 
first assessment of the state of play. What the future may hold clearly depends on the 
capacity of applicants to consolidate the bridges that these early cases have built, and to 
continue to use them; and it also depends on judges’ willingness to recognize that 
human rights and climate change obligations are mutually reinforcing and should be 
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